CISA Layoffs Cripple Critical Infrastructure Security Partnerships

According to Utility Dive, the Trump administration has effectively closed the division of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency that coordinates critical infrastructure cybersecurity improvements, with sweeping layoffs in mid-October eliminating almost all 95 employees in CISA’s Stakeholder Engagement Division. The cuts, taking effect in early December, will leave three of the division’s four units without any staff: Council Management, Strategic Relations, and International Affairs, leaving only the small Sector Management unit intact. Former officials including Michael Daniel, President Obama’s cybersecurity adviser, warned the reductions “continue a pattern of weakening the US government’s ability to carry out its cybersecurity responsibilities” and risk leaving CISA “blind to certain threats and trends.” Industry executives from healthcare and energy sectors expressed alarm that the cuts “create a dangerous void” and could “have negative impacts to our national security.” This dramatic restructuring raises serious questions about America’s cyber defense posture.

The Institutional Knowledge Vacuum

The elimination of CISA’s Stakeholder Engagement Division represents more than just headcount reduction—it creates a dangerous vacuum of institutional knowledge and trusted relationships that took years to build. Critical infrastructure security depends on continuous, trusted communication between government agencies and private sector operators who control approximately 85% of the nation’s essential systems. These relationships aren’t easily replaced; they’re built through countless meetings, joint exercises, and crisis responses where trust is earned through demonstrated competence and reliability. The specialized personnel who managed these relationships understood not just the technical requirements but the political and operational nuances of each sector—knowledge that cannot be quickly transferred or documented before their departure.

Sector-Specific Vulnerabilities Amplified

Different critical infrastructure sectors face unique threat landscapes that require specialized understanding. Healthcare organizations, already struggling with ransomware attacks that can literally become life-or-death situations, lose their primary federal liaison at a time when medical facilities are particularly vulnerable. The energy sector, including pipeline operators who’ve faced sophisticated nation-state attacks, loses the coordination mechanisms that helped secure industrial control systems against catastrophic failures. Financial institutions, constantly battling sophisticated criminal networks, lose access to the government’s latest threat intelligence and mitigation strategies. What makes this timing particularly concerning is that we’re seeing CISA’s dismantling occur precisely when threat actors are becoming more organized and sophisticated in their targeting of essential services.

The Consequences of International Isolation

The elimination of CISA’s International Affairs team represents a strategic retreat from global cybersecurity leadership that will have long-term consequences. Cyber threats don’t respect national borders—ransomware gangs operate from safe havens, nation-state actors coordinate across regions, and vulnerabilities in one country’s systems can create cascading failures internationally. By cutting these partnerships, the U.S. loses influence in setting global cybersecurity standards and norms. More immediately, we lose access to foreign intelligence about emerging threats and lose the ability to coordinate takedowns of criminal infrastructure overseas. This isolation comes at a time when other nations, particularly China and Russia, are actively expanding their international cyber partnerships and influence operations.

Private Sector Fallout and Workarounds

The layoffs will force critical infrastructure operators to develop alternative information-sharing channels, potentially creating fragmented, less effective security ecosystems. We’re likely to see industry groups forming their own parallel structures, but these will lack the government’s authority, classified intelligence access, and ability to coordinate across competing private interests. The healthcare sector might strengthen Health-ISAC capabilities, while financial institutions could lean more heavily on FS-ISAC, but neither can fully replace the government’s role in threat intelligence and cross-sector coordination. This fragmentation creates opportunities for adversaries to exploit gaps between sectors and undermines the collective defense approach that’s been central to U.S. cybersecurity strategy for decades.

Long-Term Strategic Damage

Beyond immediate operational impacts, these cuts damage America’s strategic position in the global cyber landscape. Rebuilding these capabilities will take years—likely requiring a future administration to essentially start from scratch—and the trust deficit created may persist even after staffing returns. Meanwhile, adversaries are watching and will likely increase testing of U.S. critical infrastructure defenses, knowing coordination mechanisms have been weakened. The timing couldn’t be worse, with emerging technologies like 5G, IoT, and AI creating new attack surfaces that require close public-private collaboration to secure properly. The local government and small business partnerships being eliminated were particularly important for securing the broader ecosystem beyond major corporations.

The Recovery Challenge

When the political winds eventually shift and attempts are made to rebuild these capabilities, the recovery process will face significant challenges. The specialized talent being lost—people who understood both government processes and private sector operations—isn’t easily replaced. Many will find employment in the private sector at significantly higher salaries, making them unlikely to return to government service. The institutional memory being lost includes lessons from past incidents, personal relationships that facilitated rapid response, and nuanced understanding of sector-specific vulnerabilities. Rebuilding will require not just hiring new staff but essentially recreating an entire ecosystem of trust and cooperation that took more than a decade to develop following the creation of DHS after 9/11.