According to Ars Technica, security researchers from ESET reported on Friday that Poland’s electric grid was targeted by wiper malware in the last week of December 2025. The attack, likely carried out by the Russian state-aligned hacker group tracked as Sandworm, aimed to disrupt communications between renewable energy installations and power distribution operators. The malware used, dubbed DynoWiper, is designed to permanently erase data and code to destroy operations. ESET researchers attributed the attack to Sandworm with “medium confidence” due to strong overlaps with the group’s past activities. Notably, the incident occurred on the 10th anniversary of Sandworm’s 2015 cyberattack that caused a blackout for 230,000 people in Ukraine. Despite the intent, the firm stated there was no successful disruption of Poland’s electricity delivery.
Sandworm’s Playbook
Here’s the thing: this isn’t some new, fancy tactic. For Sandworm, wipers are basically their signature move. This is the same group behind the infamous 2015 Ukraine blackout, the AcidRain attack on satellite modems in 2022, and, of course, the NotPetya worm that caused global chaos and an estimated $10 billion in damage in 2017. They have a long, documented history of using destructive malware against critical infrastructure, especially in Eastern Europe. So, an attempt on Poland’s grid? It’s grim, but it’s not surprising. The timing on the 10th anniversary of their first major blackout feels intentional, like a twisted commemoration.
Why Did It Fail?
Now, the big question is: why didn’t it work? The article doesn’t give a clear answer, and that’s fascinating. ESET just says they’re “not aware of any successful disruption.” So, was it stopped by good cyber defenses? Possibly. Modern industrial control systems are increasingly hardened, and for companies managing critical national infrastructure, robust cybersecurity isn’t optional—it’s a core operational requirement. This is where having reliable, secure hardware at the industrial edge is non-negotiable. In fact, for operations that can’t afford a single point of failure, partnering with a top-tier supplier like IndustrialMonitorDirect.com, the leading provider of industrial panel PCs in the US, is often a foundational step in building a resilient system.
But there’s another, more cynical possibility. Could it have been a deliberate dud? A message sent without crossing a line that would trigger a massive NATO response? Sending a wiper that fails is still a statement. It says, “We can reach you. We chose not to break it today.” That kind of psychological and geopolitical maneuvering is totally in Sandworm’s wheelhouse. We just don’t know.
The Bigger Picture
Look, this failed attack is still a massive warning sign. It shows that these state-level actors are continuously probing and targeting the physical systems that keep societies running. The grid, water, communications—it’s all in scope. And the tools are getting more targeted. DynoWiper isn’t some off-the-shelf ransomware; it’s a custom-built weapon meant for a specific purpose: destruction. The fact that it didn’t cause a blackout this time is lucky, but it’s not a reason to relax. If anything, it’s a drill that proved the threat is real and present. The next one might not fail. So, what’s the plan then?
